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Abstract This paper introduces the idea of symbolic resources as
the use of cultural elements to mediate the representational work
occasioned by ruptures or discontinuities in the smooth experience
of ordinary life, moments when the ‘taken-for-granted’ meanings
cease to be taken for granted. In particular we are concerned with
the use of symbolic resources in moments of developmental
transitions, that is, the mobilization of symbolic elements ranging
from shared bodies of knowledge or argumentative strategies to
movies, magazines or art pieces. The paper begins with a brief
theoretical sketch of these ideas, and then presents three case
studies, each of which involves the use of a different type of
symbolic resource within a particular age group. In the first,
children are observed in interaction with a peer about a
conservation problem. In the second, adolescents are observed
negotiating the meaning of their art productions with their peers,
teachers and parents. The third example looks at Western tourists
searching for spirituality, adventure and freedom in Ladakh as an
alternative to the materialism of modernity. In each case the
analysis of the symbolic resources employed indicates the
significance of the gaze of the other in the construction of meanings,
and of the various constraints operating within specific situations.
The analysis also reveals different modes of use of symbolic
resources, linked to changing forms of reflectivity. 
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The Use of Symbolic Resources in
Developmental Transitions
People find themselves within a cultural field that furnishes them with
the symbolic means both for making sense of what happens and for
managing their interactions with others. The smoothness of most
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interactions generally serves to ensure that meanings can be
‘taken-for-granted’ while at the same time also legitimating the
processes that generate them. From time to time, however, people find
themselves faced with some kind of discontinuity, break or rupture in
their ordinary experience, and in these circumstances they have
recourse to symbolic devices available in their environments or their
‘personal culture’ (Valsiner, 1998) that enable them to make a new
adjustment to the situation or to ‘resolve’ the problem. In other words,
the use of symbolic elements by an agent in order to achieve some-
thing in a particular social, cultural and temporal context constitutes
that symbolic device as a resource that enables the agent to make a
transition from one socio-cultural formation to another (Zittoun, 2001).
By exploring the ways in which symbolic resources are employed to
mediate various transitions, this paper seeks to elaborate a con-
ceptualization of the ways in which the thought and action of people
are structured in the encounter between the subjective and the cultural.
We are particularly interested in the influence of the constraints present
in socio-cultural contexts on the use of symbolic resources. Further, in
addition to considering the ‘microgenetic’ products of specific tran-
sitions, we are concerned with the influence of broader developmental
constraints on the ability to employ symbolic resources.
Locating the Uses of Symbolic Resources in Transitions
Our general framework is a socio-cultural psychology that recognizes
that people are positioned within different and intermeshed symbolic
streams in the socio-cultural world, and in which they can be displaced
or can relocate themselves (Benson, 2001; Duveen, 1997, 2001). From
this perspective the person is seen as an agent continuously engaged
in an active process of conferring a personal meaning to the locations
and the symbolic streams in which he or she is embedded. Even where
the meanings that emerge constitute part of a collective symbolic
system, it is nevertheless a meaning that the individual has to appro-
priate for him- or herself. In part the context in which these processes
are embedded is also always a temporal one. In the present, past
gestures and habits guide actions, and orient them toward a future
(Dewey, 1934; Josephs, 1997; Tap & Malewska-Peyre, 1991). Such a
view also emphasizes the role of symbolic means in action and
thought, and that phenomena linked to the work of identity, processes
of learning, social interaction and located activities are highly
interdependent (Carugati & Perret-Clermont, 1999; Duveen & Lloyd,
1990; Hundeide, 2004). These interdependencies are precisely anchored
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in the meanings people confer on things, people and situations, on
their roles in such situations, and on their own intentions and the inten-
tions of others (Bruner, 1990; Grossen, 1988).
Processes linked to ‘transitions’ are processes of elaboration related
to the construction of meaning following a rupture in the ‘taken for
granted’ or the emergence of something otherwise unexpected. In such
circumstances the activity of meaning construction may need some
kind of catalyst; it is when people lose the common ground, the taken
for granted, that they have to re-create meaning. This is an old idea
that can be found in such diverse traditions as pragmatism (Peirce,
1877), phenomenology (Schütz, 1944), early genetic psychology (e.g.
Claparède’s law of conscious realization) and recent discussions of
social representations (e.g. Wagner, 1998; Wagner et al, 1999). Tran-
sitions involve sequences of problem/rupture, the engagement of rep-
resentational labour leading to some resolution/outcome such that
action can continue. Such ruptures can occur in one’s inner life, in one’s
direct relationship with others, because of one’s concrete or symbolic
displacement, or from having to face an ‘uncanny’ or unfamiliar object.
The kinds of representational labour involved in the construction of
new meanings might include narrative, identity, actions or skills in the
‘transition’ to a new stability. In this sense, a transition is an ‘occasion’
for development—that is, a new symbolic formation that provides a
better adjustment to a given social and material situation while pro-
tecting one’s sense of self (Perret-Clermont & Zittoun, 2001). In a strict
sense one could say that every interaction could be considered a ‘tran-
sition’, but not all interactions lead to new socio-cultural formations.
Some transitions leave no residue beyond the particular microgenetic
context in which they occur, whilst others may have ontogenetic or
even sociogenetic consequences (cf. Duveen & Lloyd, 1990). Tran-
sitions can indeed open new possibilities, even if they always involve
some loss (Baltes & Staudinger, 1996). During transition, under the
emergency of the situation, people can mobilize different kinds of
resources, internal—experience and skill—or external, such as help,
advice or symbolic elements.
We are interested in the uses of symbolic elements: that is, in shared
concrete things, or some socially stabilized patterns of interaction or
customs that encapsulate meanings or experiences for people (whose
experiences minimally overlap at this symbolic point; Cole, 1996).
Some symbolic elements are cultural artefacts, like books or films;
some are parts of complex, regulated symbolic networks with localiz-
able boundaries (the Christmas crib takes its meaning from a defined
set of rules, stories, institutions . . .). They can also be situation-specific:
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argumentative styles or objectified judgements (such as putting a
painting on a wall). What turns a symbolic element into a resource is
both (a) the fact that it is used by someone for something; and (b) that
in the context of a transition that results in a new socio-cultural for-
mation, it entails a significant re-contextualization of the symbolic
element to address the problem opened up by a rupture and to resolve
it (Zittoun, 2001, 2003).
Symbolic resources are defined in their use in individual symbolic
activity (as they arise in transitions) in two senses: firstly, it is only
when a symbolic element (which might crystallize a representation or
be a manifestation of an aspect of a social representation) is used that
it becomes a symbolic resource; and, secondly, the precise character of
a symbolic resource is circumscribed by the particular character of the
elements employed (i.e. what is actually used to mediate the inter-
action). Such forms of symbolic activity, while being personal and con-
nected to one’s sense of self, always take place in the ‘shadow’ of real
or imaginary others (people, institutions, traditions), a shadow that is
always projected upon the here-and-now situation, constituting part of
its socio-cultural frame.
The metaphoric notion of ‘use’ in a psychological sense has a double
root. Vygotsky develops the idea of a person’s ‘use’ of symbolic
realities—language—as tools to form and channel thoughts. Another
root of the notion of use is to be found in Winnicott’s work: an object
that can be used is an object given by the environment, the reality-
status of which does not need to be clarified, but which allows a person
to do things that are mainly related to ‘emotional’ and identity
development. One can ‘use’ an object, the image of someone, a
sentence, a frame, a cultural thing . . . to be sure to exist, to find a sense
of unity and continuity through time, to rearrange one’s own under-
standing about something, to symbolize one’s feelings, to extend one’s
human experiences, notably through ‘experiences by proxy’, and so on
(Winnicott, 1968/1989, 1971/1982). Generally speaking, use designates
employing objects as instruments to do things. Objects can be used to
act upon or within the physical world, the social world and the world
of psychic reality (Blandin, 2002). Our examples will cover these three
spheres of human action and thought; however, we will focus on the
uses of objects for which the symbolic presence of the element is of
more importance, or where the use of the resource implies a reference
to the experience of others encapsulated in its symbolic, sharable form.
More precisely, uses of symbolic resources might sustain or scaffold
the work of reframing and reorganizing the chaos and the uncertainty
of a present situation. The definition of the situation can vary among
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participants and differ from the ‘official’ definition of the setting; in any
case, definitions might suggest possible actions and raise new
problems, which will call for other symbolic resources. Processes of
change can thus, for a given period, find support in such external
meanings and devices; these can be internalized, modify one’s under-
standing of one’s experience, and enable a reorganization of under-
standings and their readjustments with one’s changing experiences.
Such re-coordinations and reorganizations can be both triggered and
supported by symbolic devices.
For analytical clarity, we can distinguish ‘external’ from ‘internal’
effects of uses of symbolic resources (Zittoun, 2001). On the external
side, one’s use of a symbolic resource can reposition one in the webs
of social relations; it can augment or diminish one’s agency and
‘power’ upon the world, through the acquisition of skills, enabling
social interactions or concrete actions. On the internal side, the uses of
resources can regulate emotional experiences, change one’s under-
standings of things or facilitate one’s meaning constructions (Bruner,
1996). Hence, the ‘uses’ of symbolic resources modify the world: one’s
own, but also the shared world, through processes of externalization
(Valsiner & Lawrence, 1997)—the creation of new symbolic realities.
Finally, the use of symbolic resources can, in turn, create or modify
available symbolic elements that might be used as resources.
While future-oriented, such processes are neither necessarily goal-
directed, nor consciously intentional. If ‘using’ always supposes a kind
of intentionality—in the weak sense of ‘having one’s mind applied to
something’ (Y. Greub, personal communication, 23 March 2002)—this
does not mean that this is always done with a full awareness or reflex-
ivity (how reflexive ‘uses’ of symbolic resources must be is one of the
questions we will discuss). It is through interpersonal negotiations and
uses of symbolic resources that the ‘goals’ of a situation are often pro-
gressively constructed, as, for example, in the case of matters of ‘defi-
nition of the situation’, as explored by Grossen and Perret-Clermont
(1994): in a given frame, to construct what the situation is about—and,
therefore, what the agent’s role is supposed to be—is also part of
problem-solving (at school, for example, or in a therapeutic situation).
Symbolic resources offer temporary definitions, ‘quasi-aims’, bringing
provisional meanings to some actions. Their use might confer some
temporary reassurance, or bring some stability to the oscillation
between actions and aims, experience and personal meaning. The
symbolic resources used often represent possibilities and contain some
hints about their consequences, thus proposing possible paths to the
future (Josephs, 1997, 1998) and offering a semiotic regulation and
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canalisation of action (Valsiner, 1998). We might think here of a moun-
taineer opening a new path up a cliff. He has to create the route to the
summit, but at each moment he is mainly concerned with finding the
next point to fix his rope to assure his own security and that of his com-
panions who will follow. This location is then the point from which he
defines his next movement along the cliff to find the next possible safe
point. However, symbolic resources are not always used as the result
of such a conscious intention. The extent to which symbolic resources
are employed within a reflexive frame is an issue we shall return to,
but it is one that locates the use of symbolic resources within a context
of interaction in which the gaze of the (real or symbolic) other is also
always present.
Symbolic Resources and Social Representations
Social representations (cf. Duveen, 2000; Jodelet, 2002; Moscovici, 2000)
also form part of culture and are of a symbolic nature; they offer a
means to confer meanings on ruptures and events, and thus can
furnish symbolic elements that might be used as symbolic resources.
But we also need to distinguish between these two terms, or at least
between the perspectives appropriate to each of them. Epistemologi-
cally, a social representation is a structure emerging from patterns and
programmes of communications and practices that take place within a
given social space. They are identified by researchers through a long
process of distillation, and are conceptualized as distributed systems
of meaning and action, as social facts that exceed the symbolic activity
of any one individual. In contrast, symbolic resources are things that
have an actual, concrete embodiment. In short, social representations
are constituted as part of a researcher’s interpretative framework for
rendering some form of social action intelligible, while, in speaking
about symbolic resources, we want to emphasize the practical or prag-
matic quality with which people make use of the things they find
within their field of action.
Of course there is a connection between these two terms. When one
of the villagers described by Denise Jodelet (1991) insists that their
‘lodger’ uses different cutlery, they are not analysing social represen-
tations of madness, but, rather, trying to avoid being contaminated by
the lodger’s madness. Here the researcher and the villager may be
interested in the same material artefact, the cutlery, but what each of
them is doing with it, what they are using it for, is quite different. For
the researcher, the cutlery is a sign that becomes both visible as a seg-
mented aspect of the villager’s material world and also meaningful as
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part of the villager’s practice, because it can be interpreted within a
framework of social representations of madness that render intelligi-
ble these aspects of the cutlery and its use. For the villager the cutlery
presents a far more pragmatic question. While they may be concerned
with maintaining a sense that their world sustains a symbolic integrity,
it is doubtful that they would themselves be in a position to express
that integrity at all the complex levels that Jodelet describes. It is an
integrity that is felt rather than articulated—and if it were otherwise,
then research itself would be redundant. A social representation is a
horizontally distributed system of meaning, while a symbolic resource
is a punctual element that makes a vertical connection between internal
life and social meanings through a particular and actual object that is
both experienced and symbolic. If a social representation is like a net
thrown over fruit trees to protect them from birds, a symbolic resource
is a particular knot in the fabric that a bird tries to unpick. Thus, this
distinction brings into play the idea of agency—the agency of the user
of the symbolic resource—an issue that is only gradually coming to the
forefront of social representations research (cf. the discussions on social
identity in Deaux & Philogène, 2001). In a reflexive way we could say
that for our theoretical endeavour the idea of social representations
constitutes a kind of symbolic resource.
Constraints on Uses
Transitions always involve constructions of meaning, and where there
is construction there are also constraints (cf. Duveen, 2002a, 2002b). We
can distinguish two forms of constraint in the use of symbolic
resources. Firstly there are constraints in access to, the ability to use,
and the content of a symbolic resource (one can be freer and construct
more complex things with complex artefacts than with single symbols).
Secondly, there are the products of that use, which may be a constraint
on action, both in the sense of restricting possibilities, but also in the
sense of enabling forms of action.
Social representations exercise some constraint on a person’s access
to a symbolic resource through their constitutive role in people’s iden-
tities and their related actions. They can also contribute to the process
of legitimization of the use of specific symbolic resources. However,
the use of symbolic resources can also reinforce or challenge social
representations. The products from particular usages may serve to
redefine identities or positions, or to regulate conflicts between webs
of meaning attached to social representations in which a person is
inscribed. Symbolic resources and social representation can be
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interlinked and interdependent through representational changes
across time, as in the dynamics described by Bauer and Gaskell (1999).
People’s positions within symbolic networks inform the range and
type of resources available to them, and thus also constrain uses of
symbolic resources, at the level of both access and products. These
positions themselves are more or less controlled by other agents—
peers, teachers, tour operators—who exert more or less power, and
therefore also constrain access to symbolic resources. On the one hand,
the main function of legitimation is to regulate both access to symbolic
elements and the manner of their use (e.g. censorship, school curric-
ula, inquisition, mass media, all of which can also be supported by
social representations). On the other hand, even within such con-
straints, the use of a particular symbolic element may serve to relocate
someone symbolically in opposition to a given position, and therefore
call for a redefinition of the status attributed by others (e.g. if a ‘bad’
student is seen by his or her teacher reading a ‘good’ book, he or she
may be symbolically legitimized and relocated). As well as these
‘external’ positionings, the products of the use of symbolic resources
can also be more ‘internal’ in the reshaping of a person’s representation
of his or her world (the ‘good book’ can be a novel of revenge for a
lower-class boy, or offer new perspectives on events; it can contain and
symbolize some of his unformulated angst and melancholy).
However, beyond these symbolic and cultural constraints on the
uses of resources and their outcomes, there are also constraints related
to an agent’s own psychological processes. Our suggestion that there
can be variations in the extent to which people are able to reflect on
their use of symbolic resources can also be seen as a suggestion that
there may be some broad developmental constraints on such use. In
some cases there may also be constraints associated with specific forms
of expertise (or its absence).
Uses of Symbolic Resources in Three Developmental
Transitions
Within this theoretical frame, we explore three situations in which
symbolic resources are used to mediate transitions. We examine
children, adolescents and adults facing a rupture and finding them-
selves needing to elaborate new meanings in order to re-establish
stability. The children are observed engaging in a cognitive task with
a peer who can behave in unexpected ways, especially when they are
of the opposite gender. Here the rupture and the representational work
are dealt with at the micro-level of an interaction that has itself been
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strongly constrained by the adult investigators. In the second example,
adolescents find themselves facing a problem arising from the fact that
the artwork they produce in school can have different meanings in
different contexts. How can they sustain a sense of what this ‘uncanny’
object means across different social settings, and retain their own sense
of identity? In the third example, Western adult tourists arrive in
Ladakh, in the Indian Himalaya, in search of ‘authentic’ experience,
and use symbolic resources in the construction of, and reflection on,
these experiences. Of course, given these three situations and their
different constraints, people use different kinds of symbolic resources
with different aims, and different outcomes. However, these three
examples also provide the opportunity to consider the role of develop-
mental constraints on the use of symbolic resources, a role that is
explored through a focus on the extent to which people have a reflex-
ive grasp of their use of such resources.
Symbolic Resources in Children’s Peer Interaction in a
Problem-Solving Situation1
In order to consider the complexity of the use of symbolic resources in
collaborative problem solving, we shall consider the example of a
study of children collaborating on the classical Piagetian problem of
conservation of liquids (Psaltis & Duveen, 2002, 2003). In this study we
have adopted the pre-test, interaction, post-test design introduced in
Genevan research in the 1970s (cf. Doise & Mugny, 1984), and adapted
by Leman and Duveen (1996, 1999) to incorporate asymmetries of
gender in addition to asymmetries of knowledge. In these studies the
experimental design is articulated by the way in which the experi-
menter constrains the interaction phase. In the Genevan research this
often took the form of pairing children at different developmental
levels (e.g. a non-conserving or intermediate child with a conserver),
with the consequence that, during the interaction phase, children
might encounter a partner who contradicts their preferred or expected
way of giving a solution to the problem. Here each child’s resource
consists of his or her specific preferred strategy, whose expression in
the interaction also serves as a marker of his or her general pattern of
thought or level of development. The requirement imposed by the
experimenter that the children should reach a joint agreement on a
solution to the problem also serves to make each child’s initial
approach relevant to the situation, as well as constraining the formal
goal of the interaction. Thus, in our study only two pairs out of a total
of eighty-four did not reach an agreement. However, the situation
remains open in the sense that it affords different ways of reaching that
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goal by allowing children to draw on all their relevant resources. It is
this negotiation of the sub-goals and strategies used at this micro-
genetic level that forms a central focus of our studies, and we have
been interested in trying to link particular interaction patterns as
moments of identity regulations with the outcome of these negotia-
tions in terms of the cognitive development of children.
Earlier research has suggested that in these kinds of peer interaction
conservers are more assertive (e.g. Miller & Brownell, 1975), although
such generalizations in fact referred only to same-sex pairs. Where
asymmetries of knowledge are framed within mixed-sex pairs (such
as a conserving girl or boy paired with a non-conserving boy or girl,
Fm and Mf, respectively, in our notation), Leman and Duveen (1996,
1999) have reported clear gender-marked patterns of interaction in
terms of argument style. For instance, in a study employing Piaget’s
moral development stories, autonomous girls faced with heterony-
mous boys were observed to make greater use of a wider range of
arguments, in part because these boys were asserting their own
position quite clearly (Leman & Duveen, 1999, 2003). At the micro-
genetic level such conduct could be described as a form of situational
positioning at the inter-personal level. Here, the interlocutors are
making use of arguments, counter-arguments and communicative
patterns as symbolic resources to reach a joint agreement while at the
same time negotiating their positions. In our problem-solving situ-
ation, for example, one child could be claiming to be more know-
ledgeable and attempting to play the tutor, exhibiting an assertive
behavioural style, and the other child either accepting being pos-
itioned as the tutee or resisting this positioning.
From previous research (Leman & Duveen, 1999) we expected that
the gender composition of dyads would influence the communication
patterns of the discussions and the social representations of gender at
the age we were interested in (6- to 8-year olds). By including gender
as a dimension in the research design, the situations we constructed
also provided children with potential moments for the organization
and regulation of their social-gender identities. Even at this age,
children have well-established social representations of gender (cf.
Duveen & Lloyd, 1986, 1990; Lloyd & Duveen, 1990, 1992), which, in
part, furnish them with a code for managing the conduct of their inter-
actions with other children. In the interaction setting some of these
shared representations become more or less relevant and can even
provide the direction for constructive interpretations of the situation.
In fact, the internalization/externalization process (Valsiner, 1998)
present in an interaction setting—especially externalization—is
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defined by the code of conduct that is semiotically regulated by the
process of social representing. More specifically, in these interactions
the situation is framed around the articulation of different levels of
semiotic mediation. When one child employs a particular argumenta-
tive style, this can serve as the signifier for positioning both children
within the interaction, with one being placed in the role of tutor or
expert and the other as tutee or novice. But these positionings can
themselves either be consistent with or conflict with expectations about
interactions positions derived from social representations of gender. A
girl positioned as a novice by a boy asserting himself as an expert may
find this situation all too familiar, while a boy who finds himself pos-
itioned as a novice by a girl may find that this conflicts with his expec-
tations about his identity. These are only some of the possible forms in
which such interactions may take shape, since even among young
children the field of gender is not constituted as a single monolithic
representation, and there are varieties and forms of masculinities and
femininities which find expression even in the play and other interac-
tions of 5-year olds and which can produce moments of resistance to
the dominant representation (Duveen, 2001).
Different Ways of Using Symbolic Resources
The arguments, counter-arguments and argumentative styles used as
resources by children in negotiating a joint solution to the problem are
both constrained and enabled by the competencies of each interlocu-
tor and the social representations of gender. Here, the social represen-
tations of gender are legitimizing some forms of behavioural style
while creating tension in some other forms of interaction. That is
particularly true for mixed pairings.
A characteristic example of the pattern of interaction between a con-
serving boy (M) and a non-conserving girl (f) was the following:
M: They are equal because it was the same in here right? (pointing to the
pre-transformation glass).
f: Yes
M: He poured it in here but this is taller and narrower. So we have the
same right?
f: Yes. Come! (calling the experimenter)
EXP: What did you agree?
M: That we have equal
Here, the conserving boy initiates the conversation by putting forward
a conserving argument; the non-conserving girl does not resist being
positioned as the less knowledgeable tutee. In at least half of Mf
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pairings a communication pattern similar to the one presented was
taking place. We coded that pattern as ‘no-resistance’. Such patterns
were not generally linked to developmental progress on our post-test
measure. On the whole, female non-conservers did not make signifi-
cantly more progress than a control group of non-conservers who did
not take part in any interaction phase. Communication patterns of this
type can be compared to what has been described in the social-
psychological literature as compliance or conformity in studies of
social influence. The result of an application of such an argumentative
style is an asymmetry in the ownership of meaning and might result
in what Wenger (1998) calls marginalization and non-participation
through a particular form of negotiability. At the same time it is a form
of identification with a certain type of femininity legitimized by the
dominant social representation of gender in childhood.
On the other hand, Fm pairings of a conserving girl with a non-
conserving boy typically followed a bi-modal interaction pattern. It
would either be an interaction where boys would substantially resist the
girls’ conserving arguments (where at least two turns of non-con-
servers speech are rebuttals or a non-conserving argument) or explic-
itly recognize the girls’ arguments as true (where non-conservers give
at least one conservation argument or using phrases of the A-ha
moment like ‘I understand!’, ‘Oh, now I see!’). These patterns more
closely resemble what is generally described as conversion in work on
social influence, in which there is some internal reorganization rather
than merely external compliance. In some of these conversations we
even observed boys who accepted the girls’ arguments almost from the
outset and then continued the discussion by making an effort to
convince the girls that actually their newly acquired skill was some-
thing that the girls (already conservers!) should be convinced to follow!
It seemed that for these boys being positioned as the tutee by a girl
was unacceptable.
In the Mf pairings generating compliance, the argumentative style
of the boy-conserver is legitimized by the shared social representations
of gender so that the conversation follows a pattern expected by both
the boy and the girl. In the Fm pairings, however, the situation was
very different. Here the girl who started the conversation by trying to
position herself as the tutor often encountered considerable resistance
from the boy. Even in cases where the boy actually found the girl’s
arguments sufficiently compelling to accept them, he would try to save
face or take control of the discussion just before the agreement at the
end of the conversation: for example:
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F: Well, they are equal because this is fatter but this is[
m: [it’s fatter but this is narrower
F: and it looks like[
m: [and since this is taller this is less (water) but they are equal, he just
changed glass.
F: it looks like, it looks like this is more
m: they are equal, he just changed glass, and this is longer but they are
the same
F: but this is fat and it looks like it has less
m: but they are the same, shall I call him? come!
EXP: what did you agree?
m: equal
Most of the conversations that took this form were linked to cognitive
progress on the post-test for the non-conserving boy, and the post-tests
were also notable for their introduction of novel arguments. Further,
these were the only group of non-conservers who made significantly
more progress than the control group.
Outcomes: Finding an Answer, Developing New Competencies
On a theoretical level these findings suggest that interpersonal
positioning is the result of a dialectical process very similar to that
described by Marková (1990) in her three-step model. The negotiation
of interpersonal positioning directly implicates both aspects of self—
the Meadian ‘I’ and ‘me’—and therefore contributes to a redefinition
of self. In our study the parameters of the setting are established by
the constraints we introduced as experimenters. Within this frame-
work, the positioning of the self during an interaction is the result of
a dialogue between the constraints set by the experimenter, the com-
petencies of both the interlocutors, and the social representations that
legitimize or challenge the positioning as a broader cultural constraint.
In fact this inter-personal positioning has far-reaching consequences
for the cognitive development of the children through the interaction
dynamics since the resources used by each interlocutor for the solution
of the problem become, at each turn, more or less likely to be used
depending on the legitimization process that takes place.
As these comments suggest, the use of specific argument styles as
symbolic resources is continually inflected by their contextualization
within social representations of gender. An initial assertion about the
solution to the task has a different meaning when it is produced by a
conserving boy addressing a non-conserving girl than when it is used
by a conserving girl addressing a non-conserving boy. Similarly the
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arguments and counter-arguments that may follow an initial assertion
also take on different meanings according to the context in which they
are articulated. In an immediate sense the effects of the use of a specific
symbolic resource become apparent through the consequences it
produces within the interaction. Children may, then, become aware of
positioning their partner or of being positioned by him or her. But even
if the process of the interaction itself can generate some awareness of
positioning for the children, this does not in itself indicate that children
have a reflective grasp of the symbolic resources at their disposal.
Indeed, there are grounds for supposing that these children remain
largely unreflective about their symbolic resources. In the conversa-
tions themselves we observed practically no comments that indicated
any reflective grasp (whereas, as we shall see in the following two
examples, such comments did emerge in the talk of adolescents and
especially of adults). Rather, it seems that in many instances the
resources are accessible to the children only as a knowledge that can
be expressed in practice, rather than as something that can be grasped
as a resource and deployed strategically in an argument. Certainly, we
did observe some conversations in which children exhibited such
strategic use of resources, especially where a conserving child was
seeking to persuade a non-conserver. But such conversations were
generally of the substantial resistance or explicit recognition type, in which
it is often the resistance of the non-conserver that provides the occasion
for such strategic use of resources.
As we suggested earlier, there is a double articulation of meanings
in the use of symbolic resources during these problem-solving inter-
actions. At one level, the styles of arguments and counter-arguments
used by children as manifestations of the convictions they bring to the
situation are activated through the presence of the other. At a second
level, however, as we have also seen, there can be consistencies or
inconsistencies between the positions evoked by the use of these styles
and the gender relations within the pair. In this sense, positioning
always has a symbolic dimension within the field of gender. This
dimension, however, is one that is introduced by the experimenters
through the way in which we have constrained the situations, and even
if it has a structuring effect on the negotiations, this becomes apparent
only through the analysis of the whole set of transcripts. Whether the
children themselves ever reflect on the influence of gender in their con-
versations is difficult to determine, though again there were no indi-
cations of this in their comments during their conversations. However,
the gender structuring of the conversations may have different conse-
quences for children in terms of their awareness of the extent to which
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they were active participants in the solution of the problem. Com-
paring the interactions in the Mf and Fm pairs, one is struck by a
paradox. In the Mf pair there is little conflict but the interaction is
marked by the inequality in the positions of the participants; on the
other hand, in the Fm pairing the conflicts between different perspec-
tives are brought into the open in a context where the two children
exhibit a greater equality in their participation in the discussion. The
balance in the contribution to the discussion in such Fm pairs may itself
become abstracted as a semiotic mediator of ‘symmetry’ that supports
an ‘egalitarian’ solution of the conservation problem. On the other
hand, the passive positioning of a girl in the asymmetrical discussion
in Mf pairings may lead to the abstraction of a symbolic mediator of
‘asymmetry’ that hinders the subsequent elaboration or reflection upon
the problem in the post-interaction period in egalitarian terms. In other
words, it is situations like the typical Fm interaction (which are more
likely to be linked with progress on the post-test than any other same
or mixed-gender pairing) that create more tension and rupture that is
at once both cognitive and social. Such situations demand more rep-
resentational labour in order to bring the situation back to an ‘equili-
bration’ in terms of both the contradictory convictions and the
contested positionings that challenge the dominant social represen-
tation of gender in middle childhood.
These comments point towards a need for reworking the concept of
socio-cognitive conflict introduced by the Genevan researchers. The
effort to bring together the idea of ‘social marking’ and ‘socio-cogni-
tive conflict’ as a two-fold mechanism of cognitive development (Doise
& Hanselmann, 1991) was rather mechanical, and these concepts were
very rarely investigated in tandem. The rich description of the use of
symbolic resources and the constraints set upon their use in our
approach provides a clearer specification of the social aspects of socio-
cognitive conflict. As we have seen, the use of symbolic resources
afforded the resolution of both the inter-personal conflict and the task
itself, while also providing, in some circumstances at least, the occasion
for a specific transition process.
Adolescents’ Art Objects as Uncanny Objects2
Artistic productions can be viewed as extensions of the individual pro-
jected into the world and materialized in visual and physical forms.
The visible, material nature of an art object attracts speculation about
what it is, and, as a new object that appears in the world, it demands
interpretation.
In art classrooms the objects that emerge from an adolescent’s
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creative activity open up a gap between the creator and the object; in
this sense, art objects are ‘uncanny objects’. A social demand to anchor
the object by locating it within the representational field of art may well
be in conflict with functional demands of schooling. As an art object
becomes anchored within current symbolic networks, it extends a
social identity to the person who created it. A two-fold function is
implied here. The significance attached to the object reflects back on
the producer, who then has to manage the tributes, the disgust or the
shock associated with the object. However, for children or students
who produce them, art objects are uncanny objects in a second sense.
The objects that emerge from their own hands are under-determined
because they have not yet mastered the techniques to translate ideas
into objects that adequately capture their intentions. Therefore, when
trying to make sense of their own art objects, initially they rely on the
discourses of others.
From early in life, children in Western societies are presented with
paint and paper to play with. Parents interpret the squiggles, paint
splashes and blotches that their children produce as early signs of
creativity, imagination and individuality. Adults have a vested interest
in recognizing the characteristics of full personhood emerging from
their offspring. Parents’ reactions to their offsprings’ squiggles boot-
strap the child’s developmental trajectory by providing a language and
an interpretation that indicates what is expected of the child as part of
a society’s social representation of the person (Mauss, 1985).
Elements of the curriculum fulfil symbolic functions: for example,
art represents the unconscious, primitive and emotional aspects of the
person, and science, the rational, logical and cerebral (Ivinson, 1998).
Therefore accepting or rejecting a social identity extended in the art
classroom as opposed to the science laboratory has different social con-
sequences. The way art objects are ‘named’ and recognized is con-
strained by dominant social representations of art. This ensures that
there is always a limited range of social identities that will be offered
to a student in the art classroom.
The Problem: Art Objects in the Classroom
The empirical study investigated the way students made sense of their
own art objects and the symbolic resources that they had available for
doing so. Year 9 students (aged 13/14 years old) were never sure about
how their objects would turn out. Visual realism is not a generally
achieved representational stage (Golomb, 1999; Piaget & Inhelder,
1956) and few adolescents achieve it without explicit training. Graphic
development is arrested for most people in Western societies in
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comparison to, for example, China and Japan (Golomb, 1999). Yet these
students drew upon a wide range of symbolic resources to make sense
of their art objects and manage the social identities that were extended
to them.
In a series of lessons one art teacher instructed the class to create
their own lino-prints. In her opening commentary the teacher
reminded the class of the German woodcuts of the 20th century and
spoke about the political unrest and religious symbolism depicted in
various prints. She presented lino-prints by famous artists such as
Picasso to demonstrate various techniques such as how to produce a
‘clean’ and ‘strong’ print. Students practised ink rolling techniques and
experimented with applying multiple layers of coloured ink. Many
students produced finished prints during these lessons. Before placing
them on a rack at the back of the classroom to dry, students would seek
out the teacher and classmates to show off their prints. Students
chatted to each other as they worked. They spoke about aspects that
had ‘gone wrong’, about effects that had not worked and about experi-
ments that they were not happy with. Sometimes prints were ripped
up and put it in the waste-paper bin. Some students could be seen
returning again and again to the drying tray to catch a glimpse of a
finished print. Their lino-prints had become either ‘good’ or ‘bad’
objects (Benson, 2001; Winnicott, 1971/1982).
The Diversity of Interpretations
Often students took their prints and artefacts home. Although art
fulfils specific symbolic functions within the school and within society,
these values may not be recognizable or shared by others in a student’s
life. As groups such as peers, teachers and families anchor art objects
within their own hierarchically structured systems of meaning, objects
acquire values, such as good, bad, weird, creative, funny and strange,
and such meanings may be expressed in different ways. At school, for
instance, it might be the marks given by a teacher, whereas at home,
the parents frame a painting and put it on the living-room wall, or they
might just throw it away. All of these provide ‘concretized’ judgements,
and it is through these symbolic forms that students perceive the
interpretations of the gaze of the other on their art productions.
A student’s art production, then, was open to conflicting interpre-
tations. Some students experienced relative congruence across com-
munities in the way their objects were received and interpreted. Others
experienced conflict: for example, Val, who was considered by her
teacher to be good at art, spoke about her family’s recognition of her
school art objects in the following way:
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My family think it’s a bit weird, because it’s not something you see all the
time, it’s just different.
She explained that her dad had some pictures in the house because her
step-mum liked pictures of flowers and scenery. Her mum, who lived
in a different house, did not have any pictures that she could recall and
her grandmother had photographs of ‘just us’. She said that her mum
in particular considered that the art objects she produced in school
were ‘weird’. She said that the lino-print that she made during the
study would be considered ‘weird’ if she took it home.
William had a fear that he would be mocked by his younger brother
for taking art objects home that were ‘not very good’, although he said
that his parents probably would not mock him.
Brother will take the piss but not parents.
William explained, ‘when I’ve done a piece of artwork that I don’t
think is very good and I think I might get laughed at, I’ll either rip it
up or put it in the bin or hide it’. Indeed, William tore up a lino-print
in one of the classes observed. However, the production of a good art
object in the past can sustain a student through bad experiences. For
example, William took confidence from the fact that his work had pre-
viously been entered for an art competition and had met with a
favourable response:
I was happy to show my pottery in Year 7. A vase pot with shell shapes.
They thought it was very good. They complimented me.
Conversely, bad incidents from the past could also be carried forward.
Hayley talked about a critical incident from the past when she recalled
a clay pot that she had made that got smashed on the way home.
All the hours and time that you spend making something, just to find out
that it smashed on the way home. I wanted to show it to my mum. I don’t
really take it [artwork] home; I sometimes leave it at school. (prompt—why
is that?) Because there’s not enough room at home. In my house it just gets
smashed anyway. Yeah, my mum just don’t keep stuff.
There seemed to be no legitimate place for Hayley’s art objects in the
home. She said that she did not like Art and had chosen not to continue
with it the following year.
Some students, such as William and Val, acquired good enough
relationships with their art productions to see them through occasional
failures in the classroom or to sustain their interest in the subject
despite not being supported across all social settings. However, it
seemed that without some recognition that their productions were
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good, students such as Hayley disassociate themselves from their art
objects and opt not to continue with the subject in the future.
From the Gaze of the Other to a Redefinition of Identity
As art objects were anchored by various groups within their systems
of meaning, they acquired values that extended social identities to the
students. Being recognized as ‘the creative one’, ‘talented’, ‘not good
at art’ and ‘not got a clue’ placed a student under pressure to resist or
accommodate the extended identity. Val’s case demonstrates a tension
between being recognized by her teachers as ‘good at art’ and being
recognized as somewhat odd by her mother, who judged her art object
to be ‘weird’. Therefore, along with other objectifications of ideas, art
objects engender concern, interest or pride from teachers, caretakers,
peers and students themselves. It may well have been that Val’s mother
detected an incongruity between the ‘weird’ object and the kind of
person she hoped her daughter was becoming.
There were numerous ways in which art objects were recognized and
then repositioned outside the school classroom. Pictures were framed,
hung on a wall, stuck to the fridge door, given as presents to younger
siblings, taken to grandmother’s house and placed on the mantelpiece,
yet they were also accidentally smashed, lost, deliberately tidied away
or placed in the waste-paper bin. One way to avoid a possible negative
judgement about one’s self was to destroy one’s own art object before
it reached the public domain.
Students struggled to find some congruence between their own art
objects and social representations of art within society. They spoke
about art as the expression of inner feelings, showing that they recog-
nized a dominant Western social representation of art as the manifes-
tation of the inner self in external objects. They described ‘high art’ as
lofty subject matter; as idealization and as transcendental images,
acquired through visits to art galleries, occasional visits to famous
museums abroad and from lay artists whom they knew. However,
they made sense of classroom art in terms of the structures and func-
tions of school life. Therefore, they had difficulty in relating this
dominant social representation of Western art with their own art. In
consequence, they drew a strong symbolic boundary between class-
room art and what they called ‘real art’. They tended to regard class-
room art as less important and belittled their own productions. In
consequence they relied strongly on the recognition and legitimation
provided by others.
In this example, as in the previous one, adolescents were quite
strongly constrained by the power of schools and the curriculum. They
19
seemed to have an unformulated sense of the problem resulting in
clashing representations and discourses about their art productions.
They seemed intuitively to search their social environments for cues
that might be useful to position themselves, evaluate their art products,
and determine future routes of action. However, they also seem to lack
the ability for distanciation required for a more voluntary guided
exploration of possible resources.
Adults’ Touring in Ladakh3
Travel (etymology—travail (Fr.), travail, torture) implies rupture and
displacement. Tourists who travel to Ladakh, which is situated high
in the Indian Himalaya and known as ‘Little Tibet’, want to experi-
ence a different way of life, and want to be changed, to be affected,
by that experience. Although most tourists have never been to Ladakh
before, they have built up an image of it through the mass media and
word-of-mouth. In the mass media of occidental culture, the Tibetan
Plateau has been imagined as a spiritual land of peaceful Buddhists,
as a land of mountains and adventure, and an exotic and timeless land
that is as yet untouched by modernity (Dodin & Räther, 2001). All
these aspects are evident in popular films like Seven Years in Tibet and
Himalaya. This hybrid representation blends the narratives of the
Golden Age, Shangri-La and materialistic modernization (Lopez,
1998). As an imaginative space, Ladakh is remote enough and filled
with enough exotic potential to convince over ten thousand tourists
a year to make the considerable investments of time and money to
visit.
The Problem of Claiming a Position
One problem facing tourists is the identity task of claiming a certain
tourist narrative. How do they know that they have experienced the
‘real’ Ladakh? How can they narrate this experience to significant
others? Films and books are used by tourists to situate, and narrate,
their own experiences within the symbolic field. This use of symbolic
resources to claim a position is evident when tourists talk about their
holiday photographs.
One of the most common holiday photographs of Ladakh is of
Buddhist monasteries, which are invariably perched on the top of small
hills, with whitewashed buildings rising up to a red temple at the
summit. They are often described as being like the Dalai Lama’s Potala
Palace in Lhasa. These monasteries, surrounded by the snow-capped
peaks of the Himalaya, are associated with the spirituality of Ladakh.
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One English tourist, when asked why she took such a photograph,
replied:
[The Buddhist monasteries] look incredible, because I had a book on
Ladakh, and it was all the pictures I had seen and now I was there!
This woman is using the images that she had seen in books before
arriving in Ladakh to judge that she was properly experiencing
Ladakh. Presumably the pictures were of a similar monastery, and now
she was taking the photograph ‘because’ Ladakh conformed to these
pictures. Here the symbolic resource is a measure of the authenticity
of the experience.
Symbolic resources can also be used to position one’s own experi-
ences of Ladakh in the minds of significant others—to answer the
question ‘what would they think about this?’ or ‘what impression will
my narrative make on my friends and family?’ One tourist from the
USA showed a photograph of an archaic-looking stone bridge crossing
a turquoise river and said:
That’s a picture of the trail, going down into this gorge, and this bridge was
at the bottom, . . . I took that picture for friends back home, they are going
to ask me like, ‘so you walked through the Himalaya, were there photos like
in the movie Himalaya?’ For the most part there weren’t cliff-hangers, but
some were pretty extreme, so I kind of took this picture for the people back
home, although this does not look terribly dangerous, it does look very
raggedy and steep . . . great movie, I loved the scenery.
This tourist was concerned about narrating his tour to his friends. He
took the photograph because it was like the film Himalaya, which his
friends had seen. The film documents a group of distinctly ‘un-
modern’ Nepalese villagers on an arduous journey through dramatic
landscapes involving turquoise waters, rock faces that are ‘raggedy
and steep’ and stone bridges. This photograph, then, through its associ-
ation with the film, realizes the un-modern aspect of touring the
Himalaya, in part through the gaze of significant others. By taking a
photograph of the bridge he crossed, this tourist is using the photo-
graph to claim the position of an adventurer in the ancient, and unde-
veloped, Himalaya.
However, photography can be used more explicitly to position the
tourist in the field of representation—the hero can position himself or
herself within the picture. One Italian tourist showed a photograph of
his two companions and their parked scooters and said:
This was the first stop, just outside of Leh [the capital of Ladakh], you know,
we just wanted to have an Easy Rider picture.
Easy Rider is a cult film about riding motorbikes across the American
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desert. The Easy Rider image is one of freedom, the open road and
adventure. In this picture were scooters, the desert and the blue sky.
One of the companions wore sunglasses, the other, a backward-facing
baseball cap. This image manifests the freedom of being a tourist in
the Himalaya. This tourist was very impressed with the roads in
Ladakh. He described himself as a ‘lonesome cowboy’. One quarter of
all his photographs were of roads. His peak touring experience was
this scooter trip, and he wanted to narrate it with an ‘Easy Rider’ picture
of his companions on the ‘open road.’
Oscar Wilde observed that life imitates art. This brief analysis has
shown how tourists use symbolic resources—books and films—both to
evaluate their experiences as worthy of being photographed, and to
claim a position for themselves as having had a spiritual, authentic,
adventurous or free experience. The role of symbolic resources here is
both constraining and enabling. These tourists are experiencing Ladakh
through these symbolic resources, and as such are having their experi-
ence constrained. But equally this constraint is a foreground upon
which they can exercise their identity. Unlike the adolescents who are
positioned by others on the basis of their uncanny objects, the tourists
are proactively trying to create themselves as occupying the positions
that they aspire to—producing their photographs as legitimations.
Creative Elaboration of Symbolic Resources to Substantiate ‘Remote’
Ladakh
The Lonely Planet guidebook to the Indian Himalaya concludes its intro-
duction to Ladakh with: ‘Whatever the description, Ladakh is one of
India’s most remote regions’ (Mayhew, Plunkett, Coxall, Saxton, &
Greenway, 2000, p. 201). Remoteness is one of the main reasons why
tourists invest the time and money to visit Ladakh, and this investment
means that they are committed and motivated to realizing this ideal.
Some tourists satisfy this motivation by creatively elaborating what
they find in their guidebooks in the direction of remoteness, which, bor-
rowing a concept from Bartlett (1932, p. 258), constitutes one of the main
‘preferred persistent tendencies’ in tourists’ representation of Ladakh.
The tendency toward remoteness is evidenced when tourists
mention how long ago Ladakh was opened to tourists. Despite all the
guidebooks stating that Ladakh was opened to tourists in 1974, tourists
often say in interviews (conducted in 2001) that Ladakh has only been
open to tourists for four, ten, fifteen or twenty years. It is also evident
when tourists, such as this British man, emphasize the inaccessibility
of Ladakh: 
The fact that you can only go two months a year or something makes Ladakh
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special, to be in India at the right time, to be able to go to Ladakh and be
able to see something that you can’t see all year around.
There are two roads into Ladakh, each involving a two-day journey
across the Himalaya. In winter these roads can be impassable due to
snow. For this tourist, such isolation ‘makes Ladakh special’. He must
have read a guidebook to get the basic structure of his point—that the
road is closed in winter. However, in the guidebooks it is written that
the road is open not for two months but for four months (and even
this is an underestimation). Furthermore, all the main guidebooks
mention the daily flights throughout the year between Ladakh and
Delhi, though few tourists care to mention this accessibility.
In both of these examples the preferred persistent tendency in the
description of Ladakh is toward increasing remoteness. It seems that
the direction of this tendency is related to the tourists’ motivations for
being in Ladakh. From the standpoint of symbolic resources, this indi-
cates that people draw upon symbolic resources with certain moti-
vations, a desired use, for which the resources themselves are
creatively elaborated.
Tourists’ Reflection on the Use of Symbolic Resources
The most creative use of symbolic resources arises when the tourist, at
least temporarily, brings the constructive effect of the symbolic
resource within his or her own experience. So, for example, some
tourists (on some occasions) recognize a discrepancy between their
experience and the symbolic resources upon which their expectations
have been built. The following quotation is from a young English
student:
The way the guidebook did describe it was that you have breakfast with the
family while sitting on mats, more family-family, but it is just tourists and
guesthouses.
This woman is not substantiating the ideal image of Ladakh, or
twisting things in that direction; she is critically negotiating the ideal
as presented by the guidebook. The guidebook portrayed popular
guesthouses as authentic family homes. Such critique can be turned
back upon oneself, as this exchange between an interviewer and an
older couple illustrates:
Q: Why do you take photographs?
1: . . . We have all been brought up on the National Geographic
2: We are completely observers, we are not part of it
1: We don’t know what is going on 
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This couple have brought into their reflexive awareness an aspect of
the role of the National Geographic in constructing their experience,
which brings them to the self-critical appraisal that they ‘don’t know
what is going on’. The point to be made is that symbolic resources are
not just used to overcome problems and ruptures, but can themselves
become problematic, demanding further elaboration, and drawing into
play a new set of symbolic resources.
Reflections on the role of symbolic resources, like these, do not come
from nowhere; they themselves are constrained by the symbolic
resources available. One of the tourists in this study most reflexive
about tourism had read John Urry’s study of tourism, The Tourist Gaze
(1990), as part of his university sociology course. Others referred to the
popular book by William Sutcliffe, titled Are You Experienced? (1997),
which is a satire on tourists’ search for authenticity in India.
Many tourists, before leaving for Ladakh, will choose to see certain
relevant films, or bring relevant books with them to read while in
Ladakh. For example, the tourist who photographed the gorge, com-
paring it to the film Himalaya, had deliberately gone to see the film after
making his plans to tour Ladakh. And, as evidenced by his remark, the
film had mediated his experience of Ladakh. Choosing from the range
of available guidebooks on Ladakh is also a choice of symbolic
resources that is often reflectively managed. One tourist said that he
had bought the Rough Guide guidebook instead of the Lonely Planet
guidebook because ‘the Rough Guide doesn’t tell you what to think like
the Lonely Planet’. In such cases, tourists’ actions are mediated not by
the symbolic resource itself, but by the idea that the tourist has about
the mediating effect of the symbolic resource.
Routes to Uses of Symbolic Resources
We can now try to come back to our first proposition and summarize
some of the points raised in these examples. All three examples trace
situations in which individuals are confronted with a rupture in the
normal course of events. For action and thought to continue, some-
thing has to be done, acted, constructed symbolically, that gives some
meaning and allows further action. The ruptures involve different
orders of phenomena inducing different types of representational
work: the presence of others having conflicting perspectives on a task;
the insistent presence of peers, adults and the museum to reflect upon
one’s creation; the presence of objects, vacant time and a real Ladakh
that contradicts one’s previous representations. In the cases we
examined, the rupture cannot simply be said to be caused by a clash
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between representations; rather, it is lived by a specific person and
agent, the ruptures are triggered by some ‘resistance’ of the real—a
thing, a person—towards his or her action or understanding.
The transitions and ruptures can be more or less clearly perceived,
or defined as such. In the case of the children, rupture involves a micro-
genetic process, but, as we have seen, socio-cultural resources and
issues that the children are not fully aware of also enter into the com-
plexity of the situation. The emphasis seems to be on the way social
representations of gender operate within the interaction, but the
rupture that it generates is felt rather than articulated. In the case of
the adolescents, the rupture is contained within a classroom situation
that spills over into other contexts of the student’s life as he or she takes
the ‘object’ home, and so on. The emphasis seems to be on ‘managing’
conflicting socially extended identities, on the one hand, and trying to
reconcile an emerging social representation of art with the functions of
classroom life, on the other. Social representations suggest limits to
how an art object can be anchored and what kind of social identity can
be extended to the student by various groups. Again, here we are con-
fronted with problems of the ‘definition of the situation’, which can be
negotiated during social interaction, but which the adolescents might
also reflect on in isolation, outside the immediate context of interaction.
In the case of Ladakh, the rupture is both intentionally sought and
created by the tourists, becoming itself a project for which they find
appropriate symbolic resources, so that their use of these resources is
clearly reflexive.
Constraints and Symbolic Resources
The things that we have identified as symbolic elements being used as
resources are argumentative strategies, judgements and artefacts such
as books and movies. If they can be considered as concrete ‘crystal-
lizations’ of representations, what makes these social dimensions
salient for users is often a function of the situation and the presence of
other agents who play a constraining and legitimating role. Some of
these variations can also be linked to the interactive character of the
situation, which implies an ongoing construction of a definition of the
situation—which may in fact not be shared amongst the participants.
For instance, in the case of the children resolving a task, it seems as if
the girl and boy construct different ruptures and goals: he wants to
take the position of teacher (and has the arguments to do so), while
she wants to escape the situation (and uses the strategy of compliance).
The rupture for both of them seems less of a severe break with their
ordinary expectation than is the case for the boy in the Fm condition
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who knows the position he wants to occupy but finds he has only
limited resources to achieve it.
In the second example, socio-cultural, institutional, mediational
pressures are exerted on the adolescents. They seem to have some
awareness of the social representations of art involved, the contradic-
tion among concurrent representations held by various social legit-
imizing agents (school, art critics . . .), and experience a mismatch with
their localized art activities and productions. The adolescent can either
stay ‘stuck’ in these contradictions with only a partial grasp of the
social representations of art, or find alternative views. Again here, the
interaction in which the adolescent is involved will bring him or her
into conflict with a person holding different perspectives on the issue.
Their objects seem uncanny precisely because they exceed their pro-
ducers, in the sense that they carry more meaning than their produc-
ers are aware of. But this surplus of meaning is in the minds of teachers
and parents. The teacher has the problem of managing the class,
he/she uses Picasso prints as resources, and draws upon the curricu-
lum and popular representations of art when leading the class. The
parents are trying to guess the future of their child; taking the uncanny
object as a crystal ball, they read into it from a different set of represen-
tations and resources. The uses of resources here is at an ‘emergency
point’—even if the adolescents could find in the culture of the history
of art some useful tools with which to locate themselves, they are only
able to ‘use’ those tools to which they find some immediate and more
personal connection. When such usages legitimize the adolescents’
artistic activities, they serve to orient them towards further artistic
activities, which might then in turn be read from different perspectives.
In the case of the tourists, the constraints on the representational
work linked to travel are somehow given by the way the tourist-to-be
creates the problem (contrary to the school situation, where the
teachers strongly frame the problem). They create the goal of escaping
modernity to find something ‘other’ (authentic, primitive, more real,
more true). In modernity, they localize and find cultural elements that
will allow them to achieve that goal—air travel, prepared guidebooks,
cameras, correct clothing and tourist stuff. The irony is thus that
without the uses of such resources they would never manage to see
the ‘other’ as primitive/authentic/truer. There is a complex spiralling
of ‘insights’ that are opened up for the tourists by these symbolic
resources and yet the tourists themselves seem to be sufficiently aware
of the irony to be yet further troubled; the guidebook (symbolic
resource of modernity par excellence) becomes the measure of ‘authen-
ticity’. However, in situations of crisis brought on by the search for that
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goal, the person might choose, often deliberately, from a vast array of
potential resources (movies, good or bad novels), but he or she might
also reject these. In contrast to the children and adolescents, the tourists
appear isolated. Their audience and interaction partners are absent.
Though these others appear as an echo in, for example, the quotation
from the tourist who photographed the bridge ‘for friends back home’,
the work of defining the situation and the array of possible resources
depends mainly on the tourists themselves. It also seems that the kinds
of meanings they are searching for lie beyond their culturally available
tools (photos, guidebooks, films), which at best function as a concrete
token of something more transcendental—something spiritual or
Buddhist. Perhaps their own photographs come some way to achiev-
ing a satisfactory meaning construction, because they might read their
memories and feelings back into their own pictures. The pictures are
imbued with their experiences and so are extensions of themselves
(similar to the children’s art objects or ‘productions’). For the tourists,
the medium is film and ‘what’ they want to capture—the idea of
Ladakh is important, significant (it fills many needs for them). In this
sense the photos seem to be the opposite of ‘uncanny’: they seem to be
full, replete with intentionality—personal feelings, meanings and
values. The meanings that the photos need to capture and hold for the
tourist go far beyond the actual image—the landscape or the bike. But
to recover these meanings, the images need to draw on association
after association.
Outcomes of the Uses
With the use of symbolic resources, there is always something
produced, something externalized, which is attached to the producer
primarily by the gaze of the other. Such an attached outcome of a
person’s uses of symbolic resources can also take place when the other
is merely symbolic. The product is public and affords the other an
opportunity to make an attribution about who the producer is. The
product becomes a vehicle for the producer being identified as a
specific social agent. Hence, the gaze of the other on this outcome
momentarily captures the identity of the person, who will therefore be
engaged in a constant work of negotiation of that identity. Once in the
gaze of the other, this product necessarily exceeds its producer as the
meaning comes from the response of the other, and thus the producer
has to struggle to get control over the product (as manifest in the gaze
of the other). For example, the non-conserving boy in the second
example working with the conserving girl realizes the solution in inter-
action with her, uses it to ‘teach’ her, and then, calling the experimenter,
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seems to be claiming the solution to the task as his product. In one
sense, of course, it is his product since he has appropriated something
that he did not have before. But in his attitude he also seems to deny
the participation of the girl in this construction. In this sense, in each
of the studies we can distinguish the actor (boy/girl, adolescent,
tourist) from the audience (boy/girl, experimenter, teacher, parents,
classmates, friends, family, researcher). This distinction seems to be
part of the rupture in each case: the boy wants to appear dominant,
the adolescent is concerned about how other people will receive their
art object, and the tourist takes photographs to show friends and
family. Furthermore, in each case the actor appears as agentic in the
management of this situation by exerting control over the construction
and presentation of the product within which his or her identity is
entangled: the boy uses a certain argument to claim the solution as his;
the girl acquiesces so as to escape the gaze of the audience (boy and
experimenter); the adolescent pays close attention to the opinions of
their audience (teacher, friends and family) and guides his or her art
object into the public domain or into the bin accordingly; and the
tourist spends a lot of time looking for the ‘right’ photograph to
portray his or her holiday for friends and family back home. Here
again it seems as if there are increasing degrees of freedom, though in
this case they seem to be entwined with anticipating the responses of
others to the product. A methodological consequence is that it is often
possible to identify or trace back a meaning construction process,
enabled by the use of symbolic resources, through the identification of
such new symbolic objects (Zittoun, 2001).
Reflective Uses of Symbolic Resources
As we have seen, the constraints exerted upon the availability of
resources can vary a great deal, as also do the uses of the resources
themselves. Within the limits set by the various situational constraints,
people have more or less control over their identification and uses of
symbolic resources. We might distinguish three types of uses as actu-
alizations of different forms of reflectivity.
In the first example, children use argumentative strategies un-reflex-
ively: they find an augmentative style useful, but they do not seem to
be able to control its use, often appearing to act without exercising any
choice or gaining any insight about their employment of a particular
style. Adolescents seem to know that they should find resources, and
at some point find a useful one—with its comforting effects. The
tourists are the most reflective: they choose which guidebook to take
in terms of how they want their experience structured; some can be
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actively reflective in their search for relevant elements—they can guide
the uses, they can reflect upon the adequacy of these uses. Similarly,
young adults can listen to sad music when they feel sad, or refer to a
movie that is interesting because they can identify with a line of action,
or they can actively use the creativity of producing some new symbolic
resource to re-think reality (Zittoun, 2003). Thus, there are symbolic
resources that are ‘used’ without any conscious grasp of choice and
what it enables; uses that become reflective (knowing that one prefers
to choose an element for different outcomes); and reflective uses
(choices made on the basis of knowing about possible uses). Hence we
distinguish non-reflective uses, becoming-reflective uses and reflective uses.
To some extent these variations in reflective engagement may be a con-
sequence of the objects that serve as symbolic resources. Different types
of object may afford reflection in different ways: it might, for instance,
be easier to reflect on different interpretations of an art object than on
argument styles articulated in conversation. The possibility of reflec-
tion may also vary according to context, as we saw in the contrast
between the Mf and Fm conversations. Reflection may always be a
function of both object and context, but it is also linked to the extent
to which the constructive effect of the symbolic resource enters into the
experience of the user. Once the constructive effect of the symbolic
resource exists in the experience of the individual, then the individual
has greater freedom in relation to that resource—they can begin to
manage it explicitly. Such explicit managing seems important for
greater creativity of uses.
This discussion of reflectivity in the use of symbolic resources seems
to sketch a developmental line. Certainly the development of an ability
to take the perspective of the other is important here. The presence of
adults or peers who not only legitimate the use of given symbolic
resource but also adopt a reflective attitude toward it might also be
important for the emergence of such a reflective stance (cf. Fonagy,
Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002; Nelson, 2002). Hence, a person’s social-
ization history might be quite important here. Amongst tourists, the
‘academic’ ones were also the most reflective about the cultural
elements they mobilized; they indeed might have developed particular
abilities to identify and mobilize relevant symbolic resources. Finally,
we see in the case of adolescents an intermediary stage, where some
elements start to become available, without being totally ‘internalized’.
How people acquire this ability to localize and use symbolic resources
reflectively is thus important, to the same extent that it is important that
people might creatively use symbolic means to overcome situational
and symbolic constraints exerted on their actions.
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Notes
This paper results from a common reflection by the authors, following a
symposium on the use of symbolic resources organized by the first author at
the 6th International Conference on Social Representations in Stirling in 2002.
Although the central sections refer to specific studies, the theoretical
elaborations reflect the collective nature of this collaboration. This paper has
been realized thanks to a European Marie Curie Fellowship and a Corpus
Christi Research Fellowship (Zittoun), a Peterhouse research studentship and
an Economic and Social Research Council postgraduate research
studentship (Gillespie), and a Cambridge Commonwealth Trust and Corpus
Christi College research studentship (Psaltis). The authors are also grateful to
Jaan Valsiner and Mary Alston Fitts for their very helpful comments on this
paper.
1. This section refers to a study by Charis Psaltis and Gerard Duveen that is
part of a larger project that aims at rendering intelligible the role of identity
in peer interaction and cognitive development. In this study asymmetry in
knowledge was always present during the interaction phase since a
conserver was always paired with a non-conserver. As in Leman and
Duveen (1999), the gender combination of pairs was also varied to produce
four pair-types: conserving boys working with non-conserving boys (Mm);
conserving boys working with non-conserving girls (Mf); conserving girls
working with non-conserving girls (Ff); and conserving girls working with
non-conserving boys (Fm).
2. This section refers to an ongoing study by Gabrielle Ivinson.
3. This section refers to a study by Alex Gillespie.
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